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ABSTRACT
Today, AI is increasingly being used in many high-stakes decision-
making applications in which fairness is an important concern.
Already, there are many examples of AI being biased and making
questionable and unfair decisions. The AI research community has
proposed many methods to measure and mitigate unwanted biases,
but few of them involve inputs from human policy makers. We
argue that because different fairness criteria sometimes cannot
be simultaneously satisfied, and because achieving fairness often
requires sacrificing other objectives such as model accuracy, it is
key to acquire and adhere to human policy makers’ preferences
on how to make the tradeoff among these objectives. In this paper,
we propose a framework and some exemplar methods for eliciting
such preferences and for optimizing an AI model according to these
preferences.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are already working alongside
humans as trusted advisors in high-stakes decision-making appli-
cations such as mortgage lending, hiring, and prison sentencing. In
these domains, fairness is an important concern and there are many
examples of AI being biased and making arguably unfair decisions.
Decisions in these domains are social constructions, and as such
need to incorporate multiple viewpoints. Current AI technology
does not readily allow for inclusion of viewpoints from those other
than the developer of the AI model. The need for deep technical
expertise is a barrier to participation for people outside of technical
domains. Research is needed to bridge this gap and allow for voices
from multiple domains to influence the creation and adoption of
fair AI. This is critical for AI that will advise on decisions that have
the potential to discriminate against certain populations, such as
racial minorities or people with disabilities.
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Machine learning, the most common form of AI today, is, by
its very nature, always a form of statistical discrimination. The
discrimination becomes objectionable when it places certain priv-
ileged groups or individuals at systematic advantage and certain
unprivileged groups at systematic disadvantage. In certain situa-
tions, such as employment (hiring and firing), discrimination is
not only objectionable, but illegal. AI researchers have produced
many algorithms that can reduce bias; however, fairness is not a
purely algorithmic concept, but a societal one. Ensuring fairness in
AI decision making is not just a matter of creating new algorithms
that are "fairer"; we argue that it is an iterative and interactive
process that involves multiple stakeholders.
If we are to take opinions from different stakeholders about
how to handle fairness issues, we must address the conflicts that
often arise within them. For example, consider the fairness of an
AI system that determines whether to grant bail to a defendant.
Arguably, a defendant’s definition of fairness is that he or she should
not be falsely denied bail, while a judge’s top concern is that he or
she is not granting bail to people who are likely to recommit a crime
or flee. Meanwhile, society as a whole might be concerned about
the system being biased against unprivileged groups. The judge’s
notion of fairness can sometimes conflict with the defendant’s
since the judge might have to deny bail requests for people who
are unlikely to flee or reoffend if the cost of crime is much higher
than the cost of jailing people. The judge’s notion of fairness can
also conflict with the society’s priority if reducing crime means
denying more bail requests from unprivileged groups. To reconcile
these different fairness criteria, stakeholders must agree on a middle
ground and the AI decision making system must optimize decisions
based on the constraints set by that agreement.
To this end, we propose a decision framework which 1) formally
defines fairness metrics and model utility with regards to the task
objective; 2) shows the relationship between different fairness met-
rics and model utility to the policy makers (PMs) so that they could
see how these metrics are connected; 3) uses formal decision analy-
sis techniques to elicit PMs’ preferential weights on each metric;
4) finds the optimal model setting that satisfies PMs’ preferences.
The resultant system thus goes beyond traditional bias mitigation
algorithms that only seek to mitigate bias on one particular fairness
metric. Instead, we take a human-centered and system point of
view to approach the problem.
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2 RELATEDWORK AND PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Fairness Criteria and Bias Mitigation
Methods
The taxonomy proposed by Barocas et al. [1] divides various fair-
ness criteria into three categories: independence, separation, and
sufficiency. These three fairness definitions, particularly the first
two, nicely correspond to the different notions of fairness held by
philosophers and the society at large. The independence criterion
requires that all groups of people receive equal rate of favorable
treatment by the decision system. This roughly corresponds to the
notion of equity, where everyone, regardless of their differences and
background, should receive support to have equal outcome. The
separation criterion requires that the false positive rates and the
false negative rates are similar across all groups. This roughly cor-
responds to the notion of equality, which entails that every group
is supported at the same level. Lastly, sufficiency requires that the
machine learning classifier assigns a score to each person that accu-
rately captures the impact of all attributes including demographics,
even if that means some demographic groups receive, on average,
lower scores. With many classifiers, if the model is well trained
on a large dataset and has high accuracy, the sufficiency criterion
is automatically satisfied because they predict probabilities that
are well calibrated to an individual’s true probability. Thus, in this
paper, we primarily focus on the first two fairness criteria. We also
focus on binary classification cases for the sake of simplicity. For
multi-class classification, the following equations and metrics need
to be extended.
Formally, independence requires that
P(Yˆ = 1|G = a) = P(Yˆ = 1|G = b)
where Yˆ is the classifier’s prediction, and G is a demographic vari-
able taken to be a protected attribute in the application domain.
Assuming Yˆ = 1 is the favorable outcome, this equation states that
the probability of favorable outcome is the same between any two
groups a and b. Many metrics relate to this notion of fairness, and
the two most used are: statistical parity difference, which is the dif-
ference between the two sides of the equation, and disparate impact
ratio, which is the ratio of probability of favorable outcome for the
unprivileged group to that for the privileged group. Often, perfect
independence cannot be achieved, and relaxation on this criteria is
allowed. Though the degree of relaxation varies from one domain
to another and is context-dependent, a legal baseline was set for
the disparate impact ratio—it should not be less than 80% based
on the guidelines from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.
The equations for the separation criterion are:
P(Yˆ = 1|Y = 1,G = a) = P(Yˆ = 1|Y = 1,G = b)
P(Yˆ = 1|Y = 0,G = a) = P(Yˆ = 1|Y = 0,G = b)
where Y is the ground truth label. The first equation indicates
that the true positive rates are the same across any two groups,
while the second equation indicates that the false positive rates are
the same. One metric for measuring deviations from this criteria is
called average odds difference, which averages the difference in true
positive rates and false positive rates between the privileged group
and the unprivileged group. So far, there is no legal precedence set
on this criterion, and thus it is up to PMs to decide its acceptable
range.
Recently, many methods have been developed to reduce biases
(cf. 2 for an overview of these methods and their open source im-
plementation). We choose to follow the method proposed by Hardt
et al. [10], which mitigate model bias by setting different classifi-
cation thresholds for different demographic groups. However, we
do not use their optimization framework since it was designed to
only optimize the model for one fairness metric (equality of op-
portunity), whereas our framework attempts to jointly optimize
multiple model fairness metrics as well as model utility based on
PM-defined priorities and constraints.
In addition, most existing debiasing methods seek to optimize
only one fairness metric, but Barocas et al. [1], Chouldechova [6],
and Kleinberg et al. [13] have shown that different fairness metrics
can conflict with each other, and reducing bias on one metric may
actually increase bias on another. The bias mitigation method that
we propose here does not seek to achieve perfect fairness on any
one criterion. Rather, we try to find a model that strikes a balance
between independence, separation, and model utility. In order to
do that, we need to elicit the PM’s policy preferences.
2.2 Preference Elicitation
In our framework, the PM decides the relative priorities of inde-
pendence, separation, and model utility. Model utility is the net
benefit of using a model. For example, in many business domains,
this could include reduced cost or increased profit, while in criminal
justice scenarios, this may include reduced crimes or population
imprisoned. Note that model utility itself could be impacted by
multiple factors, and needs to be assessed using historical data and
assumptions from the PMs. In this paper, we assume that this cost
and benefit assessment has all been completed prior to the stage of
prioritizing fairness and utility.
The problem of finding the optimal model based on three criteria
is a multi-attribute decision problem, and there is a rich literature
on this subject in the decision analysis field. One popular method
used by many decision support systems is called direct weighting
[7]. It starts by asking a decision maker to first assign scores to the
criteria based on their priorities (e.g., in a clinical decision scenario,
these criteria may be drug effectiveness, cost, and side effects), and
then assign scores to each option (e.g. different drugs) to rank them
under each criterion. In either phase, the PM first assigns a score of
1 to the lowest ranked item, and then assign scores to other criteria
or options based on how many times more important or better they
are. All scores are then normalized by dividing the sum of scores
in each category. The scores for the criteria become their weights,
and the final comparison between options are made based on the
weighted combination of scores over all criteria. This method is
easy to execute, but it is lacks test-retest reliability as shown by
Bottomley and Doyle [4].
Many methods have been proposed to improve the direct weight-
ing method. These methods typically try to improve the consistency
of the elicited preferences by making changes to the options and
asking the PM to rerank them (e.g., SMART, Simple Multi-Attribute
Rating Technique). Some also incorporate other weighting methods
such as the rank order centroid method (e.g., SMARTER, SMART
Exploting Ranks, cf. [9]). The framework we propose here will be
based on a method called the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP,
[16]). It is one of the most widely used multi-criteria methods to-
day, particularly in medical applications [14]. The main difference
between AHP and direct weighting is that AHP requires the PM to
make multiple comparisons between each pair of options or criteria.
For each pair, the PM is asked which one is better or more impor-
tant, and rate the level of importance on a one to nine ratio scale.
These ratings are then organized into a matrix, and the maximum
eigenvalue of the matrix is used as weightings for the criteria or
scores for the options. These eigenvalues in effect combines the
result of direct pairwise comparisons and the indirect comparisons
that they imply. This process also yields a consistency measure
which can be used to check whether the PM provided incompatible
pairwise ratio scores. As a result, AHP provides more consistent
and reliable weights through one unified process.
3 AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
The remainder of the paper will introduce our framework using a
hypothetical loan approval scenario, in which a binary classifier
is used to decide whether to grant a loan to an applicant. The
classifier is trained based on a part of the German Credit dataset
published on the UCI Machine Learning Repository [8]. This data
set has 20 attributes including a person’s banking records, credit
history, employment status, age, gender, etc. We transformed the
dataset’s label column such that 1 represents that a person was able
to repay his or her loan while 0 represents failure to repay the loan.
The entire data set has 1000 instances, and we split them into 64%
training set, 16% validation set, and 20% test set. The test set is used
to compute independence, separation, and utility measures.
We trained a gradient boosting decision tree model on this
dataset using the LightGBM framework [12]. The model achieves
an accuracy of 75% when the classification threshold is set at 0.5.
However, this threshold setting does not lead to the highest utility,
which is defined as expected average profit per applicant. The data
set description indicates that a false positive error—lending money
to someone who cannot repay the loan—costs five times as much
as the profit earned from a loan fully repaid. Thus, the threshold
must be set much higher than 0.5 to reject more people who may
not repay the loan.
The main fairness issue of the German Credit dataset is that
it leads to classifiers that may disproportionately penalize young
people under 26 years old (Age <= 25, cf. [11]). Among the 1000
instances in the dataset, 190 were under age 26, and they were
21% less likely to get the Good credit rating than the rest of the
population. In the next section, we will examine how PMs may use
our framework to visualize such biases and find potential solutions.
4 THE FAIRNESS-UTILITY SPACE
The first step of our framework is to show the relationships be-
tween fairness and utility to the PMs so that they can see how these
measures are connected. Similar to Cabrera et al. [5], we find visual-
izations to be a very effective medium to convey such relationships.
However, the visualizations we propose here focus more on the end
fairness and utility metrics rather than the intermediary statistics.
For the loan example scenario, we use statistical parity difference
(SPD) to measure independence, and a variant of the average odds
difference to measure separation.
We choose SPD instead of disparate impact ratio for measuring
independence because ratios are less stable when subjected to nu-
meric optimization since they quickly grow to large values when
the denominator becomes small. However, we still use disparate
impact ratio to filter out models that do not satisfy the minimum
80% legal requirement. That is, we remove models that have a dis-
parate impact ratio of less than 0.8 or greater than 1.25. The 1.25
ensures that the privileged group would not be 80% less likely to
receive favorable outcomes than the unprivileged group, which
could happen if bias is over-corrected.
Our variant of the average odds difference metric takes into
account the weights assigned to false positive and negative error.
That is, we compute a weighted average odds difference (WAOD)
as follows:
WF P (FPRp − FPRunp ) +WT P (TPRunp −TPRp )
WF P +WT P
where p indicates privileged group, unp indicates unpriviledged
group, FPR indicates false positive rate,TPR indicates true positive
rate,WF P andWT P are weights for these error. When this measure
is below zero, it signals bias against the unprivileged group, and
otherwise, bias against privileged group. In the loan approval sce-
nario, based on the prior discussion, we set the unprivileged group
to be people under 26,WF P to 5, andWT P to 1.
The utility function is domain specific, and thus we do not pro-
pose a general definition here. For the loan approval scenario, we
hypothesize that the PM measures utility in terms of profit gener-
ated per loan, which can be quantified as follows:
E[Pro f it](TPRpNp +TPRunpNunp )
− E[Cost](FPRpNp + FPRunpNunp )
where E[∗] represents the expected average profit for a loan fully
repaid or the expected average loss for a defaulted loan, and N
indicates the number of applicants in a group. Profit and cost are
assumed to be elicited from the PM, who can use existing data to
calculate them. For this example, we assume the PM set E[Profit] to
$2,000 and E[Cost] to $10,000 tomaintain the 1 to 5 ratio indicated in
the data description. This of course overly simplifies the real profit-
cost estimation process which likely depends on many factors. In
real world applications, one needs to substitute this equation with
an actual utility estimation equation.
With the three metrics defined, we randomly sample a range
of threshold settings for the classifier, and for each threshold set-
ting, we calculate the independence-separation-utility triplet. Each
threshold setting is a pair of thresholds designated for unprivileged
and privileged group separately. For example, if we have a threshold
setting of 0.6 for young people under 26 year old, and 0.7 for aged
people, then young people will be granted a loan only when the
classifier’s predicted loan-repayment probability is above 0.6, while
aged people will be granted a loan when that probability is above
0.7. For the loan example, we randomly sampled 10,000 pairs of
thresholds, and then excluded about half of them that had disparate
impact ratio outside the [0.8, 1.25] range as discussed earlier.
Figure 1 shows four visualizations we created from the results
of the different classification threshold configurations. The top
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Figure 1: Visualizations showing the relationships among
classification threshold settings and the three metrics: sta-
tistical parity difference (SPD), weighted average odds dif-
ference (WAOD), and utility (in thousands of dollars).
two and the bottom left graphs show directly how changing the
thresholds impact SPD, WAOD, and utility. It can be inferred from
the top two graphs that the classifier is indeed likely to be biased
against young people if the classification thresholds are set to be the
same for the young and aged group. This is because the diagonal
lines in the two graphs, which are made of equal threshold settings,
cross a lot of red regions, which signify negative SPD and WAOD
and indicate bias against the unprivileged group. The white regions
in these two graphs are where SPD and WAOD are close to 0,
indicating fairness according to the respective metric. The SPD
graph shows that these white regions are mostly above the diagonal
line, meaning that to achieve a fair classifier, in most cases the
threshold for aged people has to be set larger than the threshold
for young people.
The bottom left graph showswhere the highest utility is achieved.
As can be seen, utility is mostly negative for many threshold set-
tings, but only become positive when both thresholds are above 0.8
(yellow region at the top right corner). PMs can view graphs like
this to see how their cost-benefit assumptions affect the optimal
decision threshold from the utility point of view. Combined with
the top two graphs, one can also see that this high utility region is
close to some white SPD and blue WAOD regions, suggesting that
it is possible to find models with high utility and SPD fairness, but
that might come with some drawback on the WAOD metric.
The bottom right graph in Figure 1 removes the thresholds and
directly show the relationships among the two fairness and the
utility metrics. Ideally, one hopes to find models with the highest
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Figure 2: The fairness-utility graph showing only models
with positive utility. Utility in thousands of dollars.
utility around the origin point (SPD=0, WAOD=0), but for our ex-
ample scenario, those points appear to have low utility (dark blue
color). In contrast, high utility points (yellow) appeared around
WAOD=0.1, though it is unclear from this graph which exact point
has the highest utility and close to 0 SPD and WAOD.
In an application designed to help PMs make decision policies,
these graphs can be made interactive to allow PMs filter data based
on some metrics. For example, a PM may choose to remove config-
urations that have negative utility in order to see graphs like the
bottom right one in Figure 1 more clearly. Figure 2 shows such a
graph, and one can see more clearly where the high utility points
lie (e.g. the yellow point around WAOD=0.25 and SPD=0.1). We
believe that visualizations like this are important tools to inform
PMs about the tradeoff relationships among the three metrics, and
is key for them to make the next decision: express their preferences
on how to prioritize utility, independence, and separation.
5 FAIRNESS-UTILITY POLICY ELICITATION
Though the visualizations help PMs see the relationship among
independence, separation, and utility, they only show a sample of
the possible model configurations. There are likely better configu-
rations outside the 10,000 random samples. To find them, numer-
ical optimization methods such as Bayesian optimization can be
deployed, but they require well defined optimization objectives.
Therefore, the second step of our framework is to elicit the PM’s
relative weightings on the fairness and utility metrics so that the
optimization objective can be defined. As discussed in the Related
Work section, this step is a multi-criteria decision analysis process,
and will be completed using a technique called Analytic Hierarchy
Process (AHP).
Unlike traditional usage of AHP that requires the PM to rank
both the criteria and the alternative options on each criterion, we
only ask the PM to rank the criteria. This is because: a) we have
infinite amount of options—infinite possible threshold settings for
the privileged and unprivileged groups; and b) we do not need
the PM to rank each option on each criterion since they can be
ranked directly by our independence, separation, and utility metrics.
Therefore, as long as we have the PM’s weight for each metric,
Figure 3: A screenshot of the preference elicitation part of
our system.
we can combine the three metrics into one single metric and use
automatic optimization to find the best model threshold setting.
Using AHP to elicit weightings requires the PM to compare every
pair of criterion and the comparisons need to be about a unit of one
metric against a unit of another. These units need to be somewhat
comparable and intuitively comprehensible for the PMs. One way
to determine the unit is to divide the range of each metric into equal
number of intervals. In our example, for the model configurations
with positive utilities, independence (SPD) ranged from -0.1 to 0.1,
separation (WAOD) ranged from 0.5 to 0.25, utility ranged from
$0 to $200 per applicant. We divided each range into 2 intervals,
resulted in an interval size of 0.1 for SPD and WAOD, and $100 for
utility.
Our framework is implemented with an interactive web interface,
and Figure 3 shows the preference elicitation part that applies the
AHP method. Note that in the web interface, we translated the
obtuse metric names into domain-based descriptions for PMs to
understand. This translation is critical to interface with PMs who
may not understand the subtle differences between the two fairness
criteria.
On the web interface, the level of importance is assigned on a
1 to 9 scale. For each question, if the PM prioritizes the second
option, the importance rating is inverted. The ratings for all three
questions are assembled into a matrix:
1 a b
1/a 1 c
1/b 1/c 1

where a, b, c represent the ratings assigned to the three questions.
AHP then takes the eigenvector for the matrix’s largest eigenvalue
as the weights for the three metrics.
Using this approach, the PM can express a wide range of pref-
erences. Table 1 shows a few example ratings and their resultant
weights. The first three cases explore the extreme settings allowed
by the AHP ratings. As can be seen, the maximum weight that can
be set on any one metric is 0.82 because the maximum rating is
limited to 9. The last example showcases the power of AHP express-
ing some moderate tradeoff preferences. The example says that the
PM considers SPD to be as important as utility, and both utility
and SPD to be two times as important as WAOD. This results in
a weight of 0.4 for utility, 0.4 for SPD, and 0.2 for WAOD, which
indeed satisfy the the supplied ratio ratings.
AHP always run consistency checks on the ratings, thus our
system will ask the PM to change their ratings if inconsistency is
found. Inconsistency arises when the relationship implied by two
comparisons conflicts with the result of the other, direct comparison.
For example, if utility is rated to be 9 times as important as SPD,
2 times as important as WAOD, this would imply that WAOD is
about 4 times more important than SPD. However, if the PM rates
that SPD is more important than WAOD, it would lead to a large
inconsistency score. Typically, when the inconsistency score is
greater than 0.1, re-rating is needed.
6 PREFERENCE-CONSTRAINED MODEL
OPTIMIZATION
After the metric weights are elicited, the last step of our framework
is to find the optimal model that satisfies the weight constraints.
To do this, we first combine the three metrics into an objective
function with the elicited weights:
−UtilWutil
SU til
+ |SPD |WSPD
SSPD
+ |WAOD |WWAOD
SWAOD
where S∗ are the scales applied to each metric in the elicitation
questions, i.e. 100, 0.1, and 0.1 for our example. Since this is a mini-
mization objective, we take the negative of utility and the absolute
value of SPD and WAOD. In addition, whenever the disparate im-
pact ratio is outside the range [0.8, 1.25], we emit an error for the
minimization procedure to avoid violating legal limits.
The goal of the optimization is to find classification threshold
settings for the privileged and unprivileged groups that minimize
the objective function. However, because the relationship between
the three metrics and the threshold settings are non-convex, we
cannot use traditional numerical optimization methods. We chose
to use Bayesian optimization since it has been successfully used in
many hyper-parameter tuning scenarios and have few assumptions
about the objective function. Specifically, we use the Tree of Parzen
Estimators (TPE) implemented in the python hyperopt library [3].
Table 1 lists the optimal thresholds found for each preference
setting and the resultant scores evaluated on the three metrics. As
can be seen, the Bayesian Optimization procedure seems to work
very well. The utility for the Max Utility case is indeed the largest
of all four options, while Min |SPD | and Min |WAOD | respectively
achieved perfect fairness as measured by the twometrics. The result
for the last case is interesting because it indeed finds a model that
has good utility as well as a close to 0 SPD. This suggests that our
framework is effective for PMs who want to find a middle ground
between fairness and model utility.
7 FUTUREWORK
As anymethod that involves humans in the loop, user studies should
be carried out to test the method’s effectiveness in practice. This
will be the next step of our research. We anticipate some difficulties
in helping users understand the two fairness metrics. It is likely
Table 1: Some exemplar tradeoff preferences expressed via AHP ratings, their resultant weights for eachmetric, the thresholds
of the optimal model subject to the metric weights, and the final metrics of the optimal model.
AHP ratings Weights Optimal Thresholds Metrics
Util.
vs. SPD
Util.
vs. WAOD
SPD
vs. WAOD Wutil WSPD WWAOD Young Aged Util. SPD WAOD
Max Util. 9 9 1 0.82 0.09 0.09 95.0% 92.7% $130 -0.06 0.11
Min |SPD | 1/9 1 9 0.09 0.82 0.09 84.4% 85.9% $40 0 0.14
Min |WAOD | 1 1/9 1/9 0.09 0.09 0.82 50.9% 47.4% -$250 -0.08 0
Balanced 1 2 2 0.4 0.4 0.2 95.1% 94.6% $110 -0.01 0.14
that applications based on our framework need to explain the mean-
ings of the fairness metrics to the user repeatedly using domain
relevant terms. We also expect that it will be difficult for users to
compare the three metrics and assign ratio ratings. We believe that
the interactive visualizations we developed is an important step
towards helping users make this comparison, but perhaps other
forms of visualizations and representations are also needed. Lastly,
we will compare AHP with other preference elicitation methods to
see which method the users prefer.
Preference elicitation methods like AHP require PMs to make
difficult global comparisons. An alternative method that we would
like to explore is active-learning styled elicitation, in which the
system iteratively asks the PM to make local comparisons between
many pairs of options to infer the user’s weights on the three met-
rics. Each comparison question would take the form of comparing
one option with x utility, y SPD, and z WAOD to another option
with a utility, b SPD, and c WAOD. Based on the PM’s answer, the
system decides on the next pair of options that would gain maxi-
mum information on the user’s preference weightings. This method
may require asking many questions, but it likely would lead to more
reliable preference weightings than the AHP method.
8 CONCLUSION
Fairness is a human construct, and its definition has evolved through-
out the entire human history. Because of this, we believe that ma-
chine learning systems cannot presume how policy makers would
like to handle fairness, but have to elicit fairness criteria from them.
To this end, we presented a framework that first elicits people’s
preferences on how to trade off fairness with model utility, and
then efficiently search for the model that maximizes fairness and
utility at the same time while respecting the preference constraints
imposed by the policy maker. Our framework exhibits an extra-
ordinary capacity in allowing people to express a wide range of
preferences and it has succeeded in finding the optimal models.
Although the example we showed here only involved a single
policy maker, our framework works for a group of policy makers
as well. This is because the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) has
been extended to aggregate group preferences [15]. This makes
our framework well suited for real world decision tasks where the
stakeholders often have very different backgrounds and interests.
For example, for the decisions of granting bail requests, judges
may want to prioritize reducing crimes, while citizens may want
to put more emphasis on reducing racial biases. These different
opinions can be reconciled in a transparent and principled manner
under our framework. Thus, our framework should promote social
discourses and increases people’s trust in using AI in high-stake
decision-making scenarios, which in turn increases efficiency and
fairness in the society.
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